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I. INTRODUCTION

In August 2003, for the first time in its 200-year history,1 the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) announced the compensation
package for its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 2 The NYSE's
Board of Directors revealed in a press release that it had distributed
3
$139.5 million in deferred compensation to its CEO Richard Grasso.
This payment was in addition to a base salary of $1.4 million with an
annual bonus of $1 million. 4 Due to the Exchange's status as a
nonprofit corporation, Grasso's payout "led to an outcry, as [his
compensation was] more in line with what chief executives of public
corporations are paid and [was] far above the pay of top officials at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD [National Association of
Securities Dealers] and even NASDAQ, a primary competitor."5 While
Grasso's total compensation for his first three years as CEO, including
bonuses, was $17.82 million, his total compensation from 1999 to 2002
jumped to a staggering $80.7 million. 6 Notably, during this latter
period, Grasso's close friend Ken Langone 7 served as Chairman of the
8
Compensation Committee.
Three weeks after the Board's press release, Grasso resigned. 9
Following his resignation, the Board began to examine its own

1.
Landon Thomas, Jr., Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2003, at C1.
2.
Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Announces New Contract for Dick
Grasso through May 2007 (Aug. 27, 2003) (noting that NYSE distributed to Grasso "his savings
account balance of $40.0 million, his previously accrued retirement benefit of $51.6 million and
his previously earned account balance of $47.9 million relating to prior incentive awards"),
available at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html? displayPage=/press/2_2005.html.
3.
Id. (explaining that "[t]he NYSE for many years has maintained several deferred
compensation, retirement and savings plans for its executives, including a Supplemental
Executive Retirement Plan ('SERP) to supplement benefits under the NYSE Retirement Plan,
and a Supplemental Executive Savings Plan ('SESP') to provide the executives with the ability to
supplement the NYSE Savings Plan and to defer and invest additional compensation"); see also
Plaintiffs Complaint, at 12-16, Spitzer v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2004) (No. 04-CIV-4565)
[hereinafter Complaint] (giving a more detailed analysis of each element of Grasso's
compensation package).
4.
Press Release, supra note 2.
5.
Thomas, supra note 1, at C1 (also noting that "[c]orporate governance experts said...
that the big payout was highly unusual for the head of a regulatory body"); see also infra notes
213-215 (discussing these CEO's pay packages).
6.
Complaint, supra note 3, at 11.
7.
Landon Thomas, Jr., The Man Behind Grasso's Pay Day, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at
C1.
8.
Id.
9.
Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Statement (Sept. 17, 2003), at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/press/2-2005.html.
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structure and propose various changes and reforms. 10 The Board's
new interim CEO also requested that the SEC and New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer investigate the matter, handing over to both
parties a report written by an attorney hired by the Exchange.11 In
May 2004, Spitzer sued Grasso, Langone, and the NYSE to recover the
excessive compensation paid to Grasso under New York's nonprofit
12
corporation law.
This Note will use the lawsuit brought by Spitzer as a case
study for proposing changes to New York's nonprofit corporation law.
Because New York models its nonprofit corporation law after its forprofit corporation statute, Part II will argue that use of this model is
questionable by focusing on the structure of the NYSE. Part III of this
Note will focus on the Grasso lawsuit and make predictions about the
outcome of the case under the current law. To make predictions, this
Note relies on the leading nonprofit executive compensation case in
New York. 13 Part III also will show how the for-profit corporation
model may not effectively control executive compensation in the
Grasso case.
Finally, Part IV will propose modifications to the
nonprofit corporation law to ensure that suits challenging executive
compensation can be brought successfully without increasing costs to
the corporation.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The NYSE

1. A Unique Nonprofit Corporation
The NYSE exists under New York law as a nonprofit
corporation. Founded in 1792 by twenty-four New York brokers and

10. See Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Outlines Proposals to Strengthen
Governance and Names Candidates for New Board of Directors (Nov. 5, 2003), at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/press/2-2005.html.
Now, a year and half
later, many of these changes have been implemented. See infra Part I.D.
11. Peter Elkind, The Fall of the House of Grasso, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 2004, at 312
(explaining that the new NYSE CEO John Reed "hired former federal prosecutor Dan Webb to
investigate the pay fiasco" and then "turned the report over to Spitzer and the SEC, calling on
them to investigate").
12. Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
13. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § I. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb. 10,
1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html; Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715
N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
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merchants, the NYSE was formed to serve its members. 14 Following
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the NYSE
registered as a national securities exchange with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 In 1938, to serve its members more
effectively, the NYSE adopted a "private club structure" as a model,
thus setting the foundation for the structure it maintains today.1 6 In
17
1971, the NYSE incorporated as a nonprofit organization.
"The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is that
it is barred from distributing profits, or net earnings, to individuals
who exercise control over it, such as its directors, officers, or
members.""' While all nonprofit organizations have this in common,
there are many different types of nonprofit companies. Professor
Hansmann has classified nonprofit corporations in "two dichotomous"
ways, 19 developing four types of corporations: mutual commercial,
mutual donative, entrepreneurial donative, and entrepreneurial
20
commercial.
2
Hansmann's first dichotomy is donative or commercial. '
Donative nonprofit organizations receive income in the form of
donations, whereas commercial organizations receive their income
from goods or services that they produce or provide. 22 The second
23
dichotomy is mutual benefit or public/entrepreneurial benefit.
Mutual benefit organizations have members and provide services to
these members at a fee. 24 In addition, the members typically control
the organization. 25 Public or entrepreneurial benefit organizations,
however, normally do not have members, but rather benefit the public
at large. 26 Even if they have members, those members do not have

14.

Lucy HECKMAN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES

5 (1992).
15. New
York
Stock
Exchange,
About
NYSE:
History:
Timeline,
at
http://www.nyse.com/abouthistory/timeline-1920O1939_index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
16. HECKMAN, supra note 14, at 9.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501
(1981).

19. Id. at 503; see also Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It
Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 931-32 (2003).
20. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 501.
21. Id. at 502.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 503.
24. Lee, supra note 19, at 931.
25. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 503.
26. Lee, supra note 19, at 931-32.
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control. 27 Included in the public category are most hospitals and
organizations that serve the poor or disadvantaged, like the Salvation
28
Army.
While many states' nonprofit corporation laws do not make
distinctions based on these categories, 29 New York's Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law (N-PCL) divides its nonprofit corporations into four
different types based on their purpose. 30 One of the four is a Type A
corporation,3 1 which is most similar to Hansmann's mutual
commercial organization. According to Hansmann, "social clubs and
various similar membership organizations" like the Automobile
Association of America (AAA) or country clubs are considered mutual
commercial organizations. 32 Type A corporations are "intended to
cover the usual membership type organization where the
organization's support derives from a limited class called 'members'
and where the non-pecuniary benefits flow primarily to such limited
class." 33 Whereas the "public" nonprofit organizations described above
operate to provide important public services, that the government fails
to do, mutual benefit nonprofit corporations operate solely for a
limited group of individuals.
Members of Type A corporations are like shareholders in public
corporations because both exercise some control over the corporation,
but do not actually run the corporation. Due to this similarity,
members of Type A corporations have many of the same protections as
shareholders of for-profit corporations. 34 Like shareholders in a forprofit corporation, members in a Type A corporation have both voting
power and standing to sue. 35 Suing and voting are two ways in which
members can influence
corporate decisionmaking regarding
compensation. 36 Another similarity is the right to receive an annual

27. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 503.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 530.
30. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2003).
31. § 201(b) ("Type A A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any lawful
non-business purpose or purposes including, but not limited to, any one or more of the following
non-pecuniary purposes: civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural,
horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service
association.").
32. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 582, 584.
33. § 201 cmt.
34. §§ 623, 613 (granting members standing to sue and voting rights).
35. Id.
36. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challengesto Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 569, 569-70 (2001) (making an analogous argument for
shareholders).
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report from the board of directors detailing such things as assets,
liabilities, expenses, and disbursements. 37 Also like shareholders of a
for-profit corporation, members of a New York nonprofit organization
are entitled to distribution of their share of the assets of the
38
corporation upon dissolution.
The NYSE is registered as a Type A corporation under the NPCL; however, the NYSE is unique among Type A corporations
because of its size and role.3 9
First, unlike other member
organizations
where
membership
is based on
superficial
characteristics 40 or easily attained through a small fee, 41
the
Exchange's 1,366 members are the specialists and brokers that trade
on the floor of the Exchange. 42 Each member bought a "seat" on the
trading floor, "[met] rigorous professional standards set by the
Exchange," 43 and must pay regular fees to the Exchange. 44 In
addition, the Exchange members' livelihood depends on their
membership, which entitles them to conduct for-profit business on the
trading floor.
Second, unlike typical Type A corporations, which include
smaller organizations like social and fraternal clubs, 45 the NYSE is
"the world's largest equities market .... On an average day, 1.46
billion shares, valued at $46.1 billion, trade on the NYSE." 46 One
commentator noted that "many large nonprofits are indistinguishable
from for-profit companies because, among other things, they have
47
multimillion dollar investments and they charge for their services."
The NYSE has both these features. 48 Finally, the NYSE is more
37. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2003).
38. § 1000 et seq. This is further assured to all "regular members" of the Exchange in its
Certificate of Incorporation. Certificate of Incorporation, NYSE, § 13, at 3, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/certificateofincorporation.pdf.
39. Certificate of Incorporation, NYSE, § 2, at 1, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
certificateofincorporation.pdf.
40. Two examples would be social clubs or country clubs.
41. One example would be AAA.
42. New York Stock Exchange, About the NYSE, Members:
Overview, at
http://www.nyse.com/about/members/1089312755132. html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
43. Id.
44. See Letter from Darla C. Stuckey, Corporate Secretary, NYSE, to Jonathan Katz,
Secretary, SEC 6 (June 30, 2004) (discussing member fees in the context of a proposed SEC rule).
45. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 582, 584.
46. New York Stock Exchange, About the NYSE, Overview, at http://www.nyse.com/about/
1088808971270.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
47. David W. Barrett, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small,
CharitableNonprofit Corporations,71 IND. L.J. 967, 995 (1996).
48. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FINANCIAL REVIEW 43 (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002ar-financial-review.pdf.
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similar to Hansmann's public category despite its classification under
49
New York law as a mutual benefit-type nonprofit organization.
Because Type A corporations award rights to members, which
place them in a position analogous to shareholders of for-profit
corporations, the for-profit corporation law seems like a good model
upon which to base non-profit corporation law. But, the NYSE, as the
"world's largest equity market,"50 is hardly the typical Type A
corporation. As will be shown in the following section, its role as a
regulator makes it a good case study for modest reforms to the N-PCL.
2.

Serving the Public as a Regulator

Although the Exchange can be considered a mutual benefit
organization,51 it is not so easy to categorize. 52 "[It] is a Type A
nonprofit ... under New York law. Yet, it derives much of its power
from federal securities laws. '[T]he NYSE and its officers often act as
a de facto agency, or at the least at the direction of the SEC.' "53 Under
SEC rules, the NYSE is a self-regulating organization (SRO).
As an SRO, the NYSE promulgates rules and regulations for
both its members and the listed companies. The NYSE conducts field
examinations of any members alleged to have violated the Exchange's
rules and regulations. 54 "These examinations are designed to review
each firm's: Financial integrity, Operational stability, Timelines and
accuracy of books and records, Compliance with customer protection
rules, and Sales-practice compliance programs." 55 The Exchange also
promulgates rules and regulations for its listed companies. By setting
standards by which companies can list on the Exchange, the NYSE
has great power over these companies. For example, in the Fall of
2003, the SEC approved NYSE-created corporate-governance
regulations for each listed company. 56 These regulations included
provisions as broad as requiring each listed company to include a
majority of independent directors on its board of directors and as
49. See infra Part II.A.2.
50. See supra note 46.
51. See supra notes 31, 39 and accompanying text.
52. Michael Bobelian, Spitzer Must Overcome Hurdles to Prove Grasso's Compensation Was
Unreasonable,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 2004, at 1.
53. Id. (quoting Judge Lynch, a federal judge, who ruled against Grasso's attempt to remove
the case to federal court).
54. New
York
Stock
Exchange,
Regulation:
Member
Firm
Regulation,
at
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/howregworks/1022221392606.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
55. Id.
56. Stephen Taub, SEC Signs Off on Corporate-GovernanceRegulations at the Big Board
and NASDAQ, Nov. 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58685593.
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specific as setting the frequency with which those directors must
meet. 57 Thus, the NYSE can have a significant effect on the internal
operations of listed companies by exercising its power to set listing
requirements.
The NYSE's regulation of both its members and the listed
companies affects public shareholders who own and trade stock in
these companies. Regulation of members can shape how public stocks
are traded, while regulation of listed companies' internal operations
can influence their profits and thereby the public's share in these
profits through stock. These regulatory features make the Exchange
similar to nonprofit corporations that fall into Hansmann's public
category. 58 By serving a "quasi-public" function, 59 the Exchange does
more than act like a membership organization that operates only to
benefit its own members.
B. Questionable Use of the Business CorporationLaw as a Model
The New York N-PCL is modeled after New York's Business
Corporation Law and thus provides causes of action for breaches of
fiduciary duty that are nearly identical to those under the Business
Corporation Law. 60 As noted above, the Exchange is similar to a forprofit corporation due to its size, position as a world market, and
members with rights similar to public shareholders. 6 1 Beyond these
similarities, however, there are key differences between the NYSE
and other similar public nonprofit corporations, and for-profit
corporations.
First, "a nonprofit corporation has no 'owners' or private
parties with a pecuniary stake to monitor and scrutinize actions by
the directors."6 2
Although members in commercial nonprofit
organizations like the NYSE often "exercise direct control over the
affairs of the organization," 63 the members of the Exchange lack a
financial incentive to sue for excessive compensation because, as noted
above, nonprofit organizations are prohibited from distributing profits

57. Id.
58. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
59. See Bobelian, supra note 52, at 1.
60. Compare N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 623, 715, 717, 720 (McKinney 2003), with
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 626, 713, 717, 720 (McKinney 2003); see also In Re Manhattan Eye, Ear
& Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (noting that "[niot-forprofit corporations operate under legal regimes designed for traditional for-profit corporations").
61. See supra Part II.A.1.
62. ManhattanEye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
63. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 582.
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to members. 64 Only upon dissolution can members share in the assets
of the corporation. 65 This lack of control is even more problematic at
traditional public nonprofit organizations, like charities, because they
do not have any members to bring suit.
Second, "nonprofits are seldom obliged to disclose substantial
information about their financial affairs, either to patrons or to the
state
officials
nominally
responsible
for
overseeing
the
organizations." 66 In the case of the NYSE, it was not until 2003 that
the Exchange first released information about the salary paid to its
chairman and CEO, evidencing the lack of disclosure requirements at
the NYSE. Furthermore, this information was only released after
67
intense media coverage pressured the Board to disclose.
Third, the financial press does not relentlessly cover most
nonprofit organizations until after scandals arise. 68 Although much
has been published about Grasso's cqmpensation, this publicity did not
occur until after the Exchange released his salary. 69 Unlike the forprofit sector, financial analysts do not track every transaction made by
the Exchange or other public nonprofit corporations in the same way
that they follow for-profit corporations.
Analysts and financial
organizations lack a financial incentive to do so because its actions
affect only its 1,366 members, rather than the public at large. This
argument against public scrutiny is weaker for the Exchange because
of its position as a world market; however, it is surely true for other
public nonprofit organizations that do not have a strong commercial
presence like the Exchange.
Fourth, nonprofits lack certain market mechanisms that
promote caution. For example, "[iun the for-profit context, having to
compete on an organizational level (against other businesses providing
similar products or services) and on a personal level (for directorial
jobs and prestige) causes directors to be more diligent in their duties,
for fear of being ousted from their positions." 70 While the NYSE has
64. Id. at 501.
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. Hansmann, supranote 18, at 568.
67. See Elkind, supra note 11, at 310 (noting that "there was no way the news of Grasso's
huge payout wouldn't leak; the board had to announce it").
68. Matthew D. Caudill, Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York Not-for-Profit
Corporation, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 481 (2003); Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing
Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 139 (1993) (explaining that
"[n]onprofit directors.., make decisions in a less transparent environment [than for-profit
directors] and information about their decisions is not regularly exposed to the scrutiny of a
broad audience [and] ... become visible only in the wake of scandal.").
69. Press Release, supra note 2.
70. Lee, supra note 19, at 957.
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faced competition recently, it has a substantial market share 7l and
therefore does not face the same competition as many public
companies.
Moreover, other public "nonprofits face far less
competition than business corporations, and .... '[IJn a world in which
managerial performance is not based on easily observable criteria (like
profits or share prices),' the nonprofit market for skilled managerial
72
talent is not as effective in inducing directors to behave properly."
Nonprofit organizations, therefore, may be more likely to have
reckless or negligent directors who engage in unlawful behavior.
Finally, the NYSE is different from the typical for-profit
corporation due to its function as an SRO. 73 By serving a quasigovernmental role, the Exchange has a greater responsibility to the
public at large:
With 1,500 employees and revenues of less than $1 billion, the NYSE [is] tiny compared
with .. .corporate giants. In fact, it [isn't] a normal profit-seeking business at all, but
operated more like a public utility, charging fees to both its listed companies and the
firms that operated on the exchange .... There [are] other important differences: The
exchange [doesn't] face market risk the way companies 7[do]
every day. It [doesn't] have
4
publicly traded stock. Besides, it [is] a regulatory body!

While the Business Corporation Law in New York was developed to
protect "corporate giants," the NYSE is not one of these giants. Being
"a regulatory body," it should be subjected to stricter standards than
traditional large public corporations.
These differences between public nonprofit corporations like
the Exchange and for-profit corporations suggest that the Business
Corporation Law serves as a poor model for guarding against abuses
by directors and officers of public nonprofit corporations.
C. Precedent:The Adelphi Case
Richard Grasso certainly is not the only nonprofit executive to
receive an excessive compensation package, but there is scant
precedent in New York applying the N-PCL to an excessive
compensation case. There is one case, however, on which many expect
Spitzer to rely heavily: the Adelphi University 75 scandal that arose in
71. Mara Der Hovanesian & Ben Elgin, The NYSE: A Thousand Cuts, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2004, at 78-79 (noting that although the NYSE's share of trading in its listed stocks has slipped
substantially in the wake of the Grasso scandal, it remains at 78.5%).
72. Lee, supra note 19, at 957.
73. See supraPart II.A.2.
74. Elkind, supranote 11, at 296.
75. Kate Kelly, Grasso Takes More Heat on Pay, WALL ST. J, Apr. 20, 2004, at C1 (noting
that "regulators are studying two 1997 suits with parallels to the NYSE case," one of which was
the Adelphi case); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unfinished Business at the NYSE, 231 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (2004)
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the late 1990s involving its President and board of trustees. After
Adelphi's President Peter Diamandopoulos was reported to be the
second highest paid college president in the United States, two actions
were brought against Diamandopoulos and the Board of Trustees
charging them with "excessive compensation paid to the university's
president; a failure to review the president's job performance; refusal
to abide by university's bylaws...
board misconduct; and
76
impermissible conflicts of interest."
The Committee to Save Adelphi, a group comprised of "faculty,
students and former members of Adelphi's board of trustees," initiated
the first proceeding. 77 The group petitioned the New York State Board
of Regents for removal of the trustees.7 8 The Board of Regents
ultimately recommended the removal of eighteen of the nineteen
79
trustees, including Diamandopoulos.
The second proceeding was an action "commenced by the
Attorney General to hold the individual ...members of the Board of
Trustees of Adelphi University financially accountable for
mismanagement of the assets of the University, in violation of the
Not-For-Profit Corporation Law."8 0 This action ultimately settled;8 1
therefore, there is just one published opinion from the attorney
82
general's action, which only addresses preliminary motions.
Both the Board of Regents decision and the New York trial
court analyze some of the N-PCL sections, which Spitzer has relied on
in the Grasso complaint. Because the Adelphi case will be the
primary precedent used by Spitzer, this Note will focus on these two
decisions in discussing the merits of Spitzer's suit.

(calling the Adelphi case that was heard in the New York Supreme Court the leading case on the
N-PCL); Spitzer May Draw on Adelphi Case in Grasso Dispute, REUTERS, May 24, 2004,
available at http://www.bufuture.net/news.html#0405.
76. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit DirectorLiability, 37 DUQ. L.
REV. 557, 566-67 (1999).
77. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § I. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb. 10,
1997), availableat http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
78. "The Regents are responsible for the general supervision of all educational activities
within the State, presiding over The University and the New York State Education Department.
The Regents are organized into standing committees and subcommittees whose members and
chairs are appointed by the Chancellor [of Education]." New York State Board of Education,
Introduction to the Board of Regents, at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/introreg.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004).
79. Comm. to Save Adelphi, § VII.
80. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (emphasis added).
81. Joseph A. Grundfest, How Much is Too Much?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A21.
82. Vacco, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
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Internal Reform at the NYSE

Following the Grasso scandal, interim chairman John S. Reed
advocated an overhaul of the Exchange's governing structure. After
incorporation as a nonprofit corporation in 1971, the NYSE created a
Board of Directors to "include ten directors from the securities
industry, ten public directors, and a full-time Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer to be elected by the Board."8 3 Until November 2003,
the Board remained virtually the same, with twenty-seven members:
twelve directors from the securities industry, twelve public directors,
the Chairman and CEO, and two Presidents, who act as co-COOs and
84
Executive Vice Chairmen.
The most significant change promoted by Reed was to use two
separate bodies to govern the Exchange: a Board of Directors and a
Board of Executives.8 5 The Board of Directors, composed of completely
indendepent directors "has full fiduciary responsibility and will
supervise the Exchange's regulation, governance, compensation and
internal controls."8 6 The Board of Executives, representing "key NYSE
87
constituents" such as specialists, floor brokers, and listed companies,
will play an advisory role to the Board of Directors and will be focused
88
more on the operations of the Exchange.
Another important change is the separation of "the NYSE's
regulatory function from its marketplace function and from influence
by members and member organizations."8 9
To accomplish this
separation, the NYSE created a new position, called Chief Regulatory
Officer (CRO). 90 The CRO will report directly to an independent
committee of directors who will in turn report to the Board of
Directors. 91
While these changes may prevent some abuses, there are two
arguments that these reforms are insufficient. First, one expert in
corporate governance argues that the CRO will "remain subject to the
NYSE's chief executive officer [because] ... the NYSE's CEO will

83. HECKMAN, supra note 14, at 11.
84. New York Stock Exchange, About NYSE,
History: Timeline, available at
http://www.nyse.com/aboutthistory/timeline_1980_1999_index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
85. New Governance Architecture, INSIDE THE NYSE, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 38, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/insidenyse.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 40 tbl.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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control, or at least primarily influence, the institution's budget and
resources."92 Therefore, as Grasso is alleged to have done, 93 the CEO
may still try to influence his own compensation awards. Second, "the
NYSE's major competitors still fear that the NYSE can use its
enforcement powers to retaliate against broker dealers who move
order flow away from the Exchange." 94 So long as the Board can still
pressure its members, the members alone will not serve as an effect
tool to curb Board abuses.
III.

SPITZER V. GRASSO: WHO WILL WIN?

A. Standing to sue
In the for-profit world, when shareholders believe that an
officer or director has received excessive compensation, they "almost
invariably file derivative actions claiming an injury to the corporation
that indirectly harms its shareholders." 95 Similarly, under the N-PCL,
members of a nonprofit corporation can bring "an action ... in the
'9 6
right of a ... corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.
Shareholders in for-profit corporations must either hold 5 percent of
the outstanding shares in the corporation or have shares with a fair
market value greater than $50,000 to have standing. 97 Member
actions similarly require that 5 percent of the total membership file
suit in order to initiate the action. 98 However, unlike shareholders,
who can overcome the 5 percent ownership hurdle by paying "security"
for expenses incurred by the corporation in defending the action,
members of nonprofit corporations must strictly comply with the 5
percent requirement. 99
As noted above, the members of the NYSE include the brokers
and specialists who trade on the stock exchange floor.100 The 5 percent
rule would require nearly 70 of the 1,366 brokers and specialists to
92. Coffee, supra note 75, at 6.
93. See, e.g., Complaint, supranote 3, at 8-9.
94. Id.
95. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 576.
96. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 2003).
97. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003).
98. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623; see also Hoffert v. Dank, 389 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976) (finding that § 623's five percent membership rule applies with equal force to §
720 despite language in § 720(b)(3) stating that an action may be brought against a director or
officer "by one or more members thereof.").
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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initiate a suit against the Exchange; however, because 518
organizations accounted for all members in 1991,101 it is possible that
only one or two firms could represent 5 percent of all members and
bring suit against the Exchange. Presuming that one firm could get
the support of each of its individual brokers and specialists, the
members of the Exchange likely would not have problems meeting the
5 percent requirement.
These brokers and specialists, however, may lack an incentive
to sue the Exchange. First, unlike shareholders, "members have little
incentive to sue... [because] any damages obtained will be awarded
back to the nonprofit, an organization in which the member has no
direct monetary stake."10 2 Shareholders, on the other hand, receive
financial benefit because they have an ownership interest in the
corporation and directly benefit from increased revenue at the
corporation. 10 3 Members of the NYSE have a financial incentive only
to the extent that they may receive lower membership fees. If filing a
suit results in lower compensation for its executives, then presumably
the NYSE would have reduced expenses and could lower its annual
membership fees; however, the Exchange could just as easily decide to
maintain the high membership fees and spend the money on
something else entirely.
Second, members may be reluctant to sue because they are
regulated by the NYSE board.1 0 4 Members of the NYSE must abide by
a strict set of standards. 10 5 Because of the Exchange's role as an SRO,
members may fear retaliation for bringing a suit.1 0 6 Unlike members
of other mutual nonprofit organizations, like AAA or country clubs,
these members' jobs and livelihoods depend upon their continued
membership in the Exchange.

101. MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF

THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 47 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993).
102. Lee, supra note 19, at 934.
103. In a derivative action, the money is awarded back to the corporation, and the
shareholder's financial benefit is indirect.
104. See Elkind, supra note 11, at 294 (noting that "Grasso's seatholders also feared him ....
Even though they owned the exchange, he was their primary regulator"); cf. Coffee, supra note
75, at 6 (arguing that the CEOs who served on the compensation committee may have wanted to
"curry favor" with Grasso because they "knew that the NYSE was one of their primary
regulators").
105. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) Member Rules (2003).
106. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Bored of Directors, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A17 (noting
that "some NYSE 'specialist' firms will tell you they were afraid of Mr. Grasso").
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The state attorney general also can bring an action on behalf of
the corporation. 10 7 More importantly, "the responsibility of enforcing
nonprofit law generally rests solely with the state attorney general,
whose task is to protect the public interest," particularly for nonmember public corporations.1 0 8 For example, in the Adelphi case, it
was the New York State attorney general who sued to recover
monetary damages. 10 9 Plaintiffs alleging wrongdoing at nonprofit
corporations often call upon the attorney general to sue on behalf of
the corporation. "Unfortunately, the monitoring of nonprofits is
frequently understaffed and lowly prioritized, given the many tasks
that the attorney general's office must juggle with limited
resources." 110
In addition, "[w]ith a few notable exceptions, the
attorney general historically has left excessive executive compensation
issues involving not-for-profits to the Internal Revenue Service." '
Although that is not the case here, as Spitzer filed suit against Grasso,
Langone, and the NYSE in May of 2004, the Grasso case is not a
typical nonprofit case, having received intense media coverage since
the summer of 2003.112
To summarize, the members of the NYSE probably could garner
the 5 percent needed to bring an action against the Board; however,
those same members may lack the incentive to do so because they are
unlikely to receive financial benefit from the suit and because it would
mean bringing a suit against the body that regulates them. The
attorney general remains the best party to bring suit. Unfortunately,
the attorney general has limited resources and public nonprofit
corporations that lack members are forced to rely solely on the

107. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(b)(1)-(4) (McKinney 2003) (also providing for
standing by the corporation, any director, officer, bankruptcy receiver or trustee, or judgment
creditor, among others.); see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112 ("authorize[ing] the
Attorney General to maintain an action to restrain a not-for-profit corporation from conducting
unauthorized activities").
108. Lee, supranote 19, at 932-33 (emphasis added).
109. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) ('This action was
commenced by the Attorney General to hold the individual defendants ..
financially
accountable for mismanagement of the assets of the University, in violation of the Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law."); Vacco v. Armony, 220 N.Y. L.J. 22, 22 (Aug. 7, 1998) ('The Attorney General
commenced this action in March 1995 ... seek[ing] a judgment (1) directing the defendants to
account for all funds they obtained as a result of their wrongdoing; (2) surcharging defendants
for any losses to UWA resulting from their misconduct, with interest .
.
110. Lee, supranote 19, at 932-33.
111. Francis J. Serbaroli, Health Law; Executive Compensation at Not-for-Profits Under
Scrutiny - Part 2, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29, 2004, at 3.
112. Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Spitzer Files Suit Seeking Millions of Grasso Money, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 2004, at Al (noting that Spitzer's decision to file suit against the Exchange,
Grasso, and Langone came after a four month investigation.).
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attorney general for enforcement. In cases which are not as highprofile or as egregious as Grasso's and Adelphi, the attorney general
may not exercise his right to sue. Thus, although the N-PCL,
provides for some parties to have standing, in practice these standing
provisions do not provide sufficient means to curb abuses like
excessive compensation.
B. Demand
When shareholders choose to bring a derivative suit
challenging the payment of excessive compensation to executives, they
are required to make demand on the corporation or show that demand
would be futile. 113
Once the shareholder makes demand, the
corporation must decide whether to comply with the demand, i.e.,
whether to pursue the case. 11 4 "Typically, a board will move to dismiss
derivative litigation ... and if the board appears to have acted
independently and to have conducted a reasonable investigation... a
court will generally grant this motion."' 15 To avoid that likelihood,
most shareholders seek to excuse demand by showing that it would be
futile.116
Under New York law, members of a nonprofit corporation are
no different than shareholders and must make demand on the
corporation.1 1 7 In the case of Grasso, the members would probably not
need to show that demand was futile because the current board asked
the SEC and the New York attorney general to file suit against the
Exchange, 1 8 suggesting that it probably would not dismiss a member
suit. If a court did require the members to prove demand futility, they
could be faced with a fairly substantial burden. 1 9
113. Thomas & Martin, supra,note 36, at 576; see also Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037
(N.Y. 1996) (explaining that the three purposes of the demand requirement "are to (1) relieve
courts from deciding matters of internal corporate governance by providing corporate directors
with opportunities to correct alleged abuses, (2) provide corporate boards with reasonable
protection from harassment by litigation on matters clearly within the discretion of directors,
and (3) discourage 'strike suits' commenced by shareholders for personal gain rather than for the
benefit of the corporation.").
114. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 576-77.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 577.
117. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 2003) (stating that in any action
by members "the complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff or
plaintiffs to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reason for not making such
effort."); cf.N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 2003) (using the same language).
118. Landon Thomas, Jr., Exchange Said to Want Move on Grasso Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2004, at C1.
119. As one court explained:

2005]

CASE OF CEO RICHARD GRASSO

355

Nonetheless, in cases like Grasso's, it seems unlikely that
demand will be a significant issue in cases alleging executive
compensation at nonprofit organizations. First, no section of the NPCL requires the attorney general to make demand. Second, in highlevel cases like Grasso's, where excessive executive compensation is
alleged, the majority of the board members who oversaw the executive
compensation would likely resign amidst the controversy, leading
members to elect a new board. 120 This new board may be less likely to
dismiss members' claims, but instead, as happened in the Grasso case,
121
may insist on a full investigation of the matter.
C. The N-PCL's "Reasonable"Compensation Requirement
N-PCL § 202(a)(12) provides:
Each corporation . . . shall have the power in furtherance of its corporate purposes...
[t]o elect or appoint officers, employees and other agents of the corporation, define their
duties, fix their reasonable compensation and the reasonable compensation of directors,
and to indemnify corporate
personnel. Such compensation shall be commensurate with
12 2
services performed.

N-PCL § 515(b) also provides that "[a] corporation may pay
compensation in a reasonable amount to members, directors, or
officers for services rendered."' 23 Unlike the Business Corporation
Code, "[t]he insertion of 'reasonable' in these statutes indicates that
legislators are less tolerant of excessive compensation in the nonprofit
area than they are in the business community." 12 4 The N-PCL
therefore provides an additional protection against abuse in the area

In New York, a demand would be futile if a complaint alleges with particularity that
(1) ... a majority of the board of directors is interested in challenged transaction ...
(2) ... the board of directors did not fully inform themselves about the challenged
transaction to the extent reasonably appropriate under the circumstances . . . (3)...
the challenged transaction was so egregious on its face that it could not have been the
product of sound business judgment of the directors.
Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1039, 1040 (N.Y. 1996). In order to allege these three elements
with particularity, the members would have to gather many facts and be able to prove each of
these three elements. This burden can provide a substantial hurdle to the members before their
case even goes to trial.
120. Kate Kelly, Reed Will Remain NYSE Chairman for Another Year, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,
2004, at C1 (explaining that Reed, Grasso's successor, installed a new "more independent board
of directors").
121. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
122. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 2003) (emphasis added).
123. § 515(b) (emphasis added).
124. Serbaroli, supra note 111, at 3.
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of compensation, beyond that contained in the Business Corporation
Law. 125
Notwithstanding this additional protection, it is not clear how
courts will interpret this provision.
" '[R]easonable' executive
compensation is not defined in the N-PCL or other laws." 126 In
addition, "no reported decisions in New York have addressed the issue
of what constitutes 'reasonable compensation' in a not-for-profit
context." 127 Professor Coffee suggests that there are two possible
interpretations. 128
First, Professor Coffee argues that § 202(a)(12) is in tension
with N-PCL § 715, which permits a majority of the board to approve
interested director transactions following full disclosure. 129 He posits
that "one could imagine ... Mr. Grasso arguing that, so long as there
was no fraud and the directors approving the transaction were
disinterested, he had no other legal obligation and could negotiate at
arm's length for the highest possible salary."'130 Under this
interpretation, § 715 would trump § 202(a)(12) by allowing
disinterested directors to approve transactions involving interested
directors. Under this approach, Grasso would be more likely to
prevail because the NYSE board unanimously approved Grasso's
pay. 131
Second, Professor Coffee cites Adelphi for an alternative
interpretation. 132 He points out that in the trial court proceeding of
the Adelphi case, the court did not interpret § 715 to trump §
202(a)(12). 13 3 Rather, the court found that "the fiduciary seemingly
cannot simply negotiate at arm's length, but rather has a duty not to
seek or receive unreasonable compensation." 134 Although the court
125. § 202(a)(12) cmt. (explaining that "[this section] is an adaptation of the Bus.Corp.L. §
202(a)(10). The word 'reasonable' has been added to qualify compensation of officers and of
directors. A sentence has been added requiring that such compensation shall be commensurate
with services performed.").
126. Serbaroli, supra note 111, at 3.
127. Id.
128. Coffee, supranote 75, at 6.
129. Coffee, supra note 75, at 6 (explaining that the tension results from the fact that § 715
"could be read either to make the business judgment rule fully applicable or simply to remove the
common law's prophylactic prohibition against fiduciaries contracting with their own
corporation").
130. Id.
131. Elkind, supra note 11, at 310 ("Ultimately a split board decided to proceed [with
Grasso's final large compensation award], before agreeing to have the vote recorded as
unanimous.").
132. Coffee, supranote 75, at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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never ruled whether Diamandopoulos' pay was substantively
reasonable
because
the parties
ultimately settled, 135 this
interpretation suggests that § 202(a)(12) creates a separate legal duty
for directors to neither accept nor award unreasonable compensation.
And, according to Professor Coffee, "[o]n this basis, Mr. Grasso has a
problem. Not only was his compensation high by any standard, ...
[B]ut Mr. Grasso's compensation virtually matched the NYSE's
revenues in some years .... [T]his looks problematic." 136 Under this
interpretation, Spitzer would likely prevail.
Unsurprisingly, Spitzer adopts this interpretation, while
adding his 137own linguistic twist. He calls § 202(a)(12) a guiding
"principle,"
rather terming it a separate legal duty. The Board of
Regents in the Adelphi case analyzed § 202(a)(12) similarly.13 8 The
first line of Spitzer's complaint reads, "This action is brought to
enforce the public's interest in effectuating the principle, articulated
in New York's [N-PCL], that officers of not-for-profit corporations be
paid only that compensation that is 'reasonable' and 'commensurate
with the services performed."' 139 He argues that a violation of this
"principle" will lead to a fiduciary duty violation due to the three
purposes of this "principle": 140
(1) to protect not-for-profit corporations, such as the NYSE, from dissipation of their
assets; (2) to assure that the assets of not-for-profit corporations are used for the benefit
of their members or the public; and (3) to prohibit officers and directors from benefiting
from private inurement and enriching themselves to the detriment of their
corporations.

14 1

Spitzer seems to envision § 202(a)(12) as an umbrella provision that
protects corporations and their assets by prohibiting self-interested
behavior by corporate officers. He expresses in terms of idealistic
"purposes" more than as a legal duty, but the end result is the same.
In four of the six causes of action against Grasso and in the one
cause of action against the Exchange, Spitzer cites § 202(a)(12). 142 In
135. Grundfest, supra note 81, at A21. The Board of Regents, as will be discussed below,
also relied on § 202(a)(12) to support its holding that the trustees violated their duty of care.
Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § II.D.2. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb. 10,
1997), availableat http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
136. Coffee, supra note 75, at 6.
137. Complaint, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
138. See infra Part III.D. (analyzing the Board of Regent's interpretation of each fiduciary
duty).
139. Complaint, supranote 3, at 48.
140. Id.; see infra Part III.D. (discussing fiduciary duties).
141. Complaint, supra note 3, at 48.
142. Id. at 43-48, 52. Notably, Spitzer did not cite § 202(a)(12) in his cause of action against
Langone for breaches of his duties of care and loyalty. Id. at 50-52.
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each breach of fiduciary duty claim, § 202(a)(12) is implicated. 143 In
discussing waste claims, Spitzer alleges "Grasso knew or is legally
chargeable with knowing that the compensation he received was
unlawful under N-PCL §§ 202(a)(12) and 515(b)." 144 Spitzer also
argues that Grasso violated both his duties of loyalty and care because
"[a]s a fiduciary of a not-for-profit corporation, Grasso could not accept
compensation without considering whether it was lawful and not ultra
145
vires under N-PCL § 202(a)(12)."'
While the first interpretation of § 202(a)(12) will be most helpful
to Grasso's case, the latter two interpretations suggest that Spitzer is
more likely to prevail regardless of whether § 202(a)(12) is seen as a
separate duty or merely a "guiding principle."
D.

FiduciaryDuty Violations

"In those cases where the plaintiff can survive the procedural
hurdles [of standing and demand], suits challenging compensation
These
practices still face important substantive hurdles."'146
substantive hurdles in the for-profit area are "proving a claim for
1 47
breach of duty of care, waste, or a breach of the duty of loyalty."'
Nonprofit corporation members or the attorney general can bring each
of these three claims under the N-PCL, 148 and Spitzer raised each one
in his complaint. 149
1. Duty of care
"Claims of the breach of the duty of care attack the procedures
that a board has used, and the information that the board has
considered, in making its decision about the challenged executive
compensation package.' 150 In its business corporation statute, New
York codified this duty of care with a requirement that directors and
officers perform their duties "in good faith and with that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
143. Outside of the fiduciary duty violations, Spitzer also argued both for the imposition of a
constructive trust and restitution because Grasso's compensation was unlawful and ultra vires
under § 202(a)(12). Complaint, supra note 3, at 44, 48.
144. Complaint, supra note 3, at 45.
145. Id. at 46.
146. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 581.
147. Id. at 573.
148. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAw §§ 715 (duty of loyalty); § 717(a) (duty of care); §
720(a)(1)(B) (waste) (McKinney 2003).
149. See infra Part III.D.1-3. (discussing Spitzer's claims for each fiduciary duty).
150. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 581.
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similar circumstances." 151
The N-PCL follows the Business
Corporation Law, except that it expands upon the Business
Corporation Law's "degree of care" phrase by substituting the phrase
"degree of diligence, care, and skill."'1 52 This difference led a trial court
to conclude that the N-PCL's "formulation. . .is an 'expansion' of the
comparable section of the Business Corporation Law which does not
contain the words '[diligence]' and 'skill.' ",153 Another difference is
that the Business Corporation Law "§ 402(b) enables corporations to
154
exculpate directors for duty of care violations such as negligence,"
while the N-PCL has no such analogous provision. 155
These
differences show that the N-PCL is stricter with regard to duty of care
violations. But, regardless of these differences, both the N-PCL and
the business corporation statute adopt an ordinary negligence
1 56
standard.
Although these statutes appear to require ordinary negligence,
the business judgment rule creates a grossly negligent or reckless
standard by establishing a "safe harbor" for directors' decisions. 157 The
business judgment rule "bars judicial inquiry into the actions of
corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest
judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate
purposes."'5 8 For that reason,
[m]ost courts, whether evaluating the conduct of for-profit or nonprofit directors, enforce
a ... lenient standard of review ....
Thus, the corporations statute sets out the
directors' duty of care, but does not address what impact breach of this duty will create.
For this reason, the business judgment rule causes a divergence between the standard of
conduct and the standard of review. One commentator has stated that, "[p]roperly
15 9
understood, the business judgment rule is simply a policy of judicial non-review.

Where the business judgment rule is in effect, plaintiffs will have a
much higher burden to meet than the statutory standard may suggest.

151. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003).
152. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a).

153. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999).
154. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b); Robert H. Roshe, Note, New York's Response to the
Directorand Officer Liability Crisis:A Need to Reexamine the Importance of D &O Insurance, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1305, 1344 (1989).
155. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 402.

156. See Lee, supra note 19, at 940 (explaining that "[tiraditionally, the reasonable person
standard has implicated an ordinary negligence review by the courts").
157. Id. at 939.
158. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
159. Lee, supra note 19, at 940. Because New York common law recognizes the business
judgment rule and its duty of care statute uses an ordinary negligence standard, the same
problem of judicial non-review would occur in New York.
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In New York, the business judgment rule seems to apply to the
directors of nonprofit corporations.
According to one scholar,
"[a]lthough the N-PCL does not expressly refer to the business
judgment rule, courts nonetheless apply the business judgment rule to
the decisions of not-for-profit corporation officers and directors." 160 At
least one opinion noted that a trial court in New York found that the
business judgment rule applied in nonprofit cases. 16 1 Another
commentator found that "while there is no case definitively deciding
this question, it appears that the business judgment rule would apply
to decisions of not-for-profit directors." 162 While the law is not entirely
clear, there is a strong argument that the business judgment rule
applies to nonprofit directors and officers.
Due to this confusion, 163 it was not surprising that the Board of
Regents in the Adelphi case was unclear as to which negligence
standard it was applying. Some language suggested that it was
employing the business judgment rule, with its gross negligence
standard, 164 while other language indicated application of a true
ordinary negligence standard.165 At one point, while paying lip service
to the business judgment rule, it also seemed to hold the trustees to
the higher, ordinary negligence standard. 166
This inconsistency may have been because, under either
standard, the Board of Regents easily concluded that the Adelphi
trustees breached their duty of care for two reasons: (1) the Board
failed to make informed decisions, and (2) the Board did not award
compensation commensurate with performance, as required by §
202(a)(12).1 67 First, the Board's lack of informed decisionmaking was
160. Caudill, supra note 68, at 459.
161. Scheuer v. 61 Assoc., 179 A.D.2d 65, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). On appeal, the appellate
court did not reach the question of whether the business judgment rule applies to directors of
nonprofit corporations. Id. at 73.
162. Pamela A. Mann, Nonprofit Governance in ADVISING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 37, 42

(Practicing Law Institute ed., 2003) (stating that "while there is no case definitively deciding this
question, it appears that the business judgment rule would apply to decisions of not-for-profit
directors.").
163. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § II.C. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb.
10, 1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
164. Id. § II.D.2. ("It is simply no defense where, as here, trustees have wholly failed to
exercise any judgment whatsoever... [and w]hen directors act blindly, recklessly and heedlessly
....").

165. Id. § II.D.1-2. (writing that "the trustees failed to exercise the degree of care and skill
that ordinarily prudent persons would have exercised in like circumstances" and that "the
trustees [cannot] invoke the rule's protections when they have failed to exercise the degree of
care and diligence which ordinary persons in their positions would exercise").
166. Id.
167. Id.
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particularly egregious.
In the eight years that Diamandopoulos
served as President, the Board "never fixed or approved
Diamandopoulos' compensation," as his salary was set by an ad hoc
committee of the board. 168 In addition, the trustees who served on the
ad hoc committee "made no reasonable effort to learn about
presidential compensation packages at comparable universities," nor
did they have "in place a formal or structured evaluation
process ....[or] articulate expectations or goals against which
Diamandopoulos' performance [could be] measured." 169 Likewise, the
trial court reviewing the University's purchase of a Manhattan
apartment for Diamandopoulos criticized Adelphi's board for "fail[ing]
to evaluate any other less costly alternatives to achieving the objective
of a 'Manhattan presence,' or to investigate how the apartment they
had previously rented had been used, or whether Adelphi had
benefited from the rental of the prior apartment in New York City."1 70
Both the Board of Regents and the state court found a breach of the
Board's duty of care using the N-PCL standards articulated in § 717.
The Board of Regents used a second ground to support its
conclusion that the Board of Trustees violated their duty of care: NPCL § 202(a)(12).1 71 Using "objective factors" like comparable pay and
performance measures, the Board of Regents found that the trustees
should not have paid Diamandopoulos as they did. 172
Despite
extensive discussion of these "objective" factors, the court noted that
the § 202(a)(12) analysis "is, to some extent, subjective." 173
Similar to the Committee's charge against the Adelphi trustees
for breach of their duty of care, Spitzer charges Langone, former
Chairman of the Compensation Committee, with breaching his duty of
care 174 "by misleading the NYSE Board of Directors... about the
amount of the annual compensation the Compensation Committee
was recommending be approved by the Board."1 75 The complaint
alleges that, during Langone's tenure as Chairman of the
Compensation Committee, the benchmark
set for Grasso's

168. Id. § II.D.l.a.
169. Id. § II.D.l.b-c.
170. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
171. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAw § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 2003); see also discussion of §
202(a)(12), supra Part I.C.
172. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § II.D.2 (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb.
10, 1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
173. Id.
174. Complaint, supra note 3, at 50.
175. Id.
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compensation "was wholly disregarded." 176
Spitzer also accuses
Langone of failing to advise the full Exchange Board "of the details of
Grasso's proposed compensation" in 2000 and 2001, pointing out that
Langone did not mention Grasso's CAP awards, 17 7 worth $6.8 million
178
and $8.05 million, respectively, at either annual meeting.
There are two ways in which a court could find that Langone
breached his duty of care. First, like the trustees in the Adelphi case,
who failed to make an informed decision, Langone allegedly did not
stick to the (albeit inflated) benchmark set for Grasso's salary and
179
failed to give complete information to the full Board as required.
Yet, unlike the trustees, Langone and the Compensation Committee
hired consultants, employed some analysis, and made reports
(although partially inaccurate) to the full Board. 180 For this reason,
using the corporate standard of grossly negligent,' 8 ' it would probably
be difficult to show that Langone breached his duty of care. But under
N-PCL § 717(a), which may be read as more expansive than the
Business Corporation's duty of care provision, 182 which requires a
"degree of diligence, care and skill," 183 a court may be more likely to
find that Langone violated his duty of care.
On the other hand, as the Board of Regents did in its opinion, a
court could use § 202(a)(12) 18 5 and conclude that failure to award
"reasonable compensation" in and of itself results in a breach of the
duty of care, 186 thereby employing Coffee's second interpretation of §
202(a)(12). 187 Although Spitzer does not make this argument with

176. Id. at 20. Furthermore, the benchmark that was used was allegedly inflated because
Grasso's salary was compared against that of executives from "enormously large and complex
financial services conglomerates" and mistakenly included the value of stock options and other
forms of pay that should not have been factors. Id. at 18.
177. "CAP' stands for Capital Accumulation Plan, which "entitled [Grasso] to a deferred
award equal to fifty percent of his [Incentive Compensation Plan]." Id. at 13.
178. Id. at 22-23.
179. See supra notes 168-169 and 174-178 and accompanying text.
180. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that "[e]ach year, Hewitt [the Exchange's
consultant] provided the NYSE with data concerning the compensation of chief executives and
other senior executives .... ").
181. See supra notes 158-157 and accompanying text.
182. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999).
183. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003).
185. See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
186. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § II.D.2. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y.
Feb. 10, 1997), availableat http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
187. See supra note 132-136.
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respect to Langone, he does make the allegation against Grasso.18 8
Spitzer bases this claim on the mere fact that Grasso accepted an
allegedly "unlawful" payment; therefore, a court may find, as in the
Adelphi cases, that the mere award or acceptance of compensation in
violation of § 202(a)(12) violated Langone's fiduciary duty of care. 189
2. Waste
Section 720(a)(1) of both the Business Corporation Law and the
N-PCL is New York's statutory version of the common law waste
claim. 190 The provision in both codes provides that an action may be
brought against an officer or director of a corporation to compel the
defendant to account for his official conduct in the following cases:
The neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his duties in the management
and disposition of corporate assets committed to his charge.
The acquisition by himself, transfer to others, loss or waste of corporate assets due to
191
any neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his duties.

New York courts use two different waste standards: first, New York's
traditional common law understanding of waste as employed in Marx
v. Akers;1 92 and second, a reasonable test as employed in Baker v.

Cohn. 193
The first approach, under New York's common law, requires
that a successful waste claim allege one of three corporate abuses:
[one], compensation rates excessive on their face or other facts which call into question
whether the compensation was fair to the corporation when approved, [two], the good
faith of the directors setting those rates, or [three], that the decision
to set the
194
compensation could not have been a product of valid business judgment.

The latter two abuses implicate the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
195
and are discussed elsewhere in this Note.
The first abuse, which "call[s] into question" the fairness of the
compensation, is known as the "classic waste" claim. It presents a
188. Complaint, supranote 3, at 46.
189. Id.
190. Cornell Mfg. Co. v. Mushlin, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting that
the purpose of § 720 is to "provid[e] redress to corporations whose assets have been wrongfully
wasted by its officers and directors.").
191. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(a)(1) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §
720(a)(1) (McKinney 2003).
192. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1043 (N.Y. 1996).
193. Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
194. Marx, 666 N.E.2d at 1043.
195. See infra Part III.D.3. (duty of loyalty), Part III.D.2 (duty of care).
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fairly high standard for plaintiffs to meet: "Under the classical waste
standard, a court asks whether the consideration the corporation
received 'is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound
business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has
paid.' "196 For that reason,"[w]aste is often considered a difficult claim
to make because a plaintiff must demonstrate that the company failed
to receive even minimal consideration for the compensation
97
awarded."1
Courts typically employ multifactored tests to determine
whether the compensation was fair on its face or whether the
corporation received adequate consideration for its expense. A leading
Delaware case involving waste examined the following factors in
determining whether there was adequate consideration: "what
executives of similar corporations .were making, whether the
company's financial condition had improved during the period of the
executive's employment, and how much the executive was required to
do in order to receive the base compensation and bonuses." 198 In
addition, a New York case used a multifactor test to assess whether
the compensation of directors and officers of a bank was excessive. 199
Although New York courts have cited this case with
approval, 20 0 there are few recent cases applying such analysis. In
Marx v. Akers, the Court of Appeals in New York dismissed a claim
challenging the "excessiveness of director compensation." 20 1 The court
held that the complaint did not show compensation excessive on its
face even though the directors of the company had given themselves
raises while their services and responsibility to the company and its
profitability had remained unchanged. 2 2 The high standard for
196. Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans,
Executive Compensation and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 145, 155 (2000)
(quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 002, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962)).
197. Thomas & Martin, supra, note 36, at 582-83.
198. Johnson, supra note 196, at 156-57 (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610-17 (Del. Ch.
1962).
199. Gallin v. Nat'l City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934):
To come within the rule of reason the compensation must be in proportion to the executive's
ability, services and time devoted to the company, difficulties involved, responsibilities assumed,
success achieved, amounts under jurisdiction, corporation earnings, profits and prosperity,
increase in volume or quality of business or both, and all other relevant facts and circumstances;
nor should it be unfair to stockholders in unduly diminishing dividends properly payable.
200. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(explaining that the lower court "referee was fully justified in finding that [a director's]
compensation was not excessive in light of his abilities and duties" (citing Gallin, 273 N.Y.S. 87));
see also Serbaroli, supra note 111, at 3 & n. 6.
201. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1043 (N.Y. 1996).
202. Id. at 1042-43.
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proving waste prevented the complaint from moving past the pleading
stage. As noted above, making a successful waste claim can prove to
20 3
be "difficult."
A second approach to waste claims is used in cases involving
closely-held corporations. New York courts use a less stringent
reasonableness standard in these types of cases. 20 4 In Baker v. Cohn,
a case in which the compensation of directors in a closely-held
corporation was at issue, a New York court held that "[i]t is common
knowledge and experience that salaries of officers in an efficiently
managed corporation must bear a reasonable relation not only to the
services rendered but to the income of the business, both gross and
net."20 5 Under this approach, a court should use the amount of
consideration, i.e., what services the director rendered in return for
his salary as well as its proportion to the company's income to
determine reasonableness.
In the complaint, Spitzer alleges that both Langone and Grasso
breached their fiduciary duties under § 720(a)(1). 20 6 Marx suggests
that Spitzer could encounter difficulty in showing this particular type
of breach, especially if a court stresses factors that focus on "whether
the company's financial condition had improved during the period of
the executive's employment" 20 7 or whether even minimal consideration
was given to the corporation. 20 8 Under these standards, Grasso could
argue successfully that there was, at the very least, minimal
consideration received by the Exchange from his service as CEO. A
letter from his attorney "argues that the NYSE's success during the
1990s-including the rise in total market capitalization-could be
linked to Mr. Grasso's leadership and policies." 20 9 In a letter in the
Wall Street Journal, Ken Langone also asserted that Grasso provided

203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
204. See Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942) (indicating that salaries of
officers need to bear some reasonable relation to the services provided and the income
generated); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REV 937, 962-963 ("Courts regularly pass on salary fairness, or lack thereof, in this area." (citing
Baker, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159)).
205. Baker, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
206. Complaint, supra note 3, at 47 (claiming that "Grasso's receipt of unlawful, ultra vires
payments" constituted waste under § 720(a)(1)); at 51 (claiming that "Langone's
misrepresentation to the NYSE Board of Director about the amount of compensation being paid
to Grasso" constituted waste under § 720(a)(1)).
207. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
208. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 582-83.
209. Gary Silverman & Andrei Postelnicu, Grasso Fights for $190M NYSE Pay, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2004, at 1; see also Der Hovanesian & Elgin, supra note 71, at 78 (crediting Grasso with
maintaining the market share of the NYSE during his term of office.).
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more than minimal consideration: "Under his leadership, the value of
seats on the exchange increased several-fold, new companies joined
the exchange in droves and healthy revenue stayed consistent even
through rough economic waters." 210 Focusing on these factors, Grasso
has a strong case that there was no corporate waste.
But, if a court were to examine "what executives of similar
corporations were making," Spitzer's case is stronger." 211 Spitzer
could show that Grasso's total compensation was completely out of line
with executives at other stock exchanges. According to the Exchange's
press release, his base salary and bonus totaled approximately $2.4
million. 2 12 This salary and bonus are not entirely out of line with
those offered by other exchanges. For example, the CEO of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) received $2.1
million in salary and bonus payments, 2 13 while the CEO of the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) received $4.4 million. 21 4 The CEO
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange received a base salary of $1.25
million. 2 15 No other disclosures, however, suggest that any stock
exchange executive had a deferred compensation package in the range
of Grasso's. The CEO of Chicago Mercantile Exchange Holdings Inc.,
did have options worth $65 to $70 million; however, the Mercantile
Exchange is a public company and these options were still much lower
than Grasso's compensation package. 21 6 Comparing his salary to
these groups, even under the strict Marx v. Akers standard, suggests
that Grasso may have a more difficult time proving waste.
Instead of using the Marx v. Akers standard, Spitzer could
argue for application of the reasonableness standard. Although courts
use the stricter Marx standard in cases involving public corporations,
Spitzer could argue that the court should apply the more lenient,
reasonableness standard because nonprofit corporations require
greater protection of their resources in the same way that closely-held
corporations do. 21 7 The Adelphi case did not discuss the claim of waste

210. Ken Langone, "Let's Bring on the Jury, Mr. Spitzer,"WALL ST. J., June 10, 2004, at A12.
211. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
212. Press Release, supra note 2.
213. Jonathan Fuerbringer, NASD Filing Discloses Salary and Bonus of Chief, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, at C1.
214. Jackie Spinner, Grasso Affair Pressures Other Markets; SEC, Investors Want
Information on Top Executives' Compensation, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at E3.
215. Reuters, CEO Pay Packages: Grasso Situation Casts Light on Other Executives' Deals,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 2003, at C2.

216. Id. (deriving these numbers from Merc share prices at the time the article was
published).
217. See Lee, supra note 19, at 946 (arguing the same).
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nor have any other cases addressed it with regard to a nonprofit
corporation. Spitzer may, therefore, have a viable argument for use of
the reasonableness standard. Second, under his view of § 202(a)(12),
Spitzer could argue that the legislature has indicated its intention to
require all compensation paid to directors of nonprofit organizations
be both "reasonable" and "commensurate with services performed" and
thus any failure to do so is a waste of corporate assets.
If Spitzer succeeds in using the reasonableness standard, he
can readily show that Grasso's salary did not bear a reasonable
relation to the income of the Exchange. In setting Grasso's salary, the
Compensation Committee used a "Comparator Group," which "was
comprised of enormously large and complex financial services
conglomerates." 2 18 These companies were chosen based "not [on]
comparability in size, revenue, or complexity, but rather [on] a
subjective sense that these companies and the NYSE might 'compete'
for executive talent." 219 The Wall Street Journal created the table
below because "Dick Grasso has argued that his NYSE compensation
was in line with executives at major financial firms."220 As the table
demonstrates, his compensation was not in line with these firms, and
furthermore, it bore no relation to the Exchange's income, as the
reasonableness test requires. 221 The table below includes the value of
stock options in all cases except Grasso's because "the exchange ha[s]
no stock options." 222 More importantly, "the pay for the comparator
group CEOs came in the form of options, which meant there was at
least some risk. But Grasso's money was never at risk,"223 making
Grasso's pay seem even more out of line.

218. Complaint, supra note 3, at 18.
219. Id. at 17.
220. Justin Lahart, Grasso's Pay Topped Most Peers, Drained Profit: Former Chief of Big
Board Did Better than Executives Who Set His Compensation, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at C3.
221. Id.; see supranote 205.
222. Elkind, supra note 11, at 298.
223. Id..
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Firm's Income (in
millions)

2000

2001 2002

$38

$54.6 $37.6 $130.2 $73

$22.49

$18.97$9.51

Total 2000

CEO's Compensation as a
% of his Company's Net
Income
001 2002 Total 2000 [2001 12002 Total

$32

$28

$133

52.1% 171.7% 133.8% 98%

(NYSE)
Henry Paulson
(Goldman Sachs)

$53.6 $3,067$2,310$2,114$7,4910.7%
$619

$878

0.8%

0.6%

0.7%

$2,2702.6%

1.3%

2.6%

2.2%

James Cayne
$19.73
(Bear Stearn Cos.)

$7.75 $22.89$50.38$773

David Komansky
(Merrill Lynch &

$32.61

$16.13$14.44$63.18$3,979$768

$2,704$7,4510.8%

2.1%

0.5%

0.8%

$28.30

$16.05 $12.48 $56.83 $1,831 $1,311 $1,031 $4,173 1.5%

1.2%

1.2%

1.4%

Co.)
Richard Fuld
(Lehman Bros.
Holdings, Inc.)

Source: Corrections and Amplifications, Wall St. Journal, June 8, 2004, at A2, C3.

The table demonstrates that not only was Grasso making more than
executives that were arguably his counterparts, but unlike those
executives, his compensation was virtually equal to, if not more than,
the Exchange's net income. "Common knowledge and experience"
therefore suggests that Grasso's compensation does not "bear a
reasonable relation .. . to the income of the business. '2 24 In addition,
the table above suggests that Grasso's compensation was not
"reasonable" and "commensurate with services performed" under §
202(a)(12).
Ultimately, if the court uses the higher standard in Marx v.
Akers and focuses on factors that look at the benefit received by the
Exchange, Grasso and Langone are more likely to be successful in
showing that there was no waste. 225 But, if the court uses either a
reasonableness standard or compares Grasso's salary to his peers at
other Exchanges, or, even those in his "Comparator Group," Spitzer is
226
more likely to prove waste.
3. Duty of Loyalty
"The 'business judgment rule'.., yields to the rule of undivided
loyalty. This great rule of law is designed 'to avoid the possibility of
fraud and to avoid the temptation of self-interest.' "227 The common
law "requires directors to act in the best interests of the corporation
224.
225.
226.
227.

Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-216 and accompanying text.
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
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and to refrain from conduct that might injure the company and its
shareholders." 228 But the duty of loyalty does not make any contract
or transaction in which a director has divided loyalty "void or voidable
for this reason alone." 229 Rather, both codes-Business Corporation
Law § 713 and N-PCL § 715-provide three protections for a selfinterested transaction.
First, a director can make a good faith
disclosure of the material facts of his or her conflict to the board of
directors, who may approve it by a majority vote of the disinterested
parties. 230
Second, following full disclosure, the shareholders or
members, depending on whether it is a for-profit or nonprofit
corporation, may approve the transaction. 231 Lastly, the director or
officers could "establish affirmatively that the contract or transaction
was fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was
authorized [or approved] by the board, a committee or the members
[or shareholders] ."232
These two code sections, only pronouncing the circumstances
under which interested transactionswill not be voided, do not provide
for liability or, for that matter, indemnity for directors who engage in
such transactions. The Board of Regents in Adelphi explained this
loophole in the statute:
Section 715 speaks only to the circumstances under which a corporation may take legal
action to void a contract where a conflict of interest exists. It does not absolve the
interested trustee of any wrongdoing if the contract is ultimately found to be fair. To
the contrary, while fairness to the corporation may somewhat relax the conflict of
interest constraints, the director's conduct must, at all times, further the organization's
233
goals and not his or her own interests.

In the Adelphi case, a conflict of interest arose when the board hired
an insurance company of which one of the trustees was an owner.234
Because the trustee failed to disclose the material terms of the
relationship between the insurance company and the school, the
transaction was voidable unless the trustees could show it was fair
and reasonable under § 715(b). While the defendants argued that the
transaction was fair, the Board of Regents disregarded the fairness
issue altogether. It found that the trustee with the conflict of interest

228. Thomas & Martin, supra note 36, at 584.
229. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §
713(a) (McKinney 2003).
230. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a)(1); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713(a)(1).
231. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a)(2); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713(a)(2).
232. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(b); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(b).

233. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § III.A. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb.
10, 1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
234. Id.
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and Diamandopoulos both neglected their duty of loyalty 235 and
recommended their removal. 236
Under the Board of Regents'
reasoning, any conflict of interest that hinders an organization's goals
while advancing those of the directors or trustees, regardless of
fairness, can result in liability. Notably, this transaction was only one
of many conflicts of interest involving the trustees of Adelphi.
In the attorney general suit in the Adelphi case, the court
noted allegations that "Diamandopoulos exerted undue influence over
the Board in order to cause it to purchase [an] apartment [for the
University which he used as a personal residence] and there are
allegations that [he] was responsible for appointing the members of
the Finance Committee, which could possibly have tainted their
recommendation." 23 7 Diamandopoulos' self-interest in the transaction
and use of his position to influence others suggested that he violated
his duty of undivided loyalty, leading the court to deny the defendants'
23
motions to dismiss. 8
Similarly, Spitzer alleges that both Grasso and Langone
violated their duties of loyalty to the NYSE. 239 Spitzer's complaint is
peppered with instances of Grasso's conflicts of interest and undue
influence over the other directors of the Board. 240 The complaint
stresses that "Grasso had the authority unilaterally to select those
who served on the Compensation Committee. He also regulated most
of them. This conflict allowed Grasso to influence directors who might
have wanted to pay him less, and to reward directors who would pay
him more." 241 In addition, the fact that Ken Langone, Home Depot cofounder and director, "headed the NYSE compensation committee
when it approved Grasso's lucrative pay package" while Grasso
simultaneously served on Home Depot's board of directors, suggests
that Langone also had a significant conflict of interest. 242
Under N-PCL § 715, Grasso's compensation transactions could
be ratified by a majority of the members or disinterested directors
upon full disclosure or by a showing of fairness. 24 3 The members of the
Exchange did not vote on Grasso's compensation, and it seems
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
2003, at
243.

Id.
Id.
Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
Id. at 270.
Complaint, supra note 3, at 46, 50.
Id. at 7-10, 16, 38.
Id. at 7.
Tony Wilbert, Home Depot Caught up in Flap at NYSE, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 27,
Al.
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 2003).
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unlikely from the analysis above that fairness could be shown unless a
Marx v. Akers approach is used. 244 This leaves disinterested director
approval as the only way to prevent voiding Grasso's compensation
awards. Because a majority of the NYSE Board approved all of the
awards, Spitzer may not be able to succeed in voiding the
245
transactions.
In order to void them, Spitzer would have to prove, as the
complaint alleges, that the directors on the Board, not just Langone,
were "interested" directors 246 or that there was not a full disclosure of
the facts. Proving directors' interest may be difficult because it is
based on an abstract notion of Grasso's ability to influence a&d
pressure other directors. Moreover, there appears to be little concrete
evidence of this influence. 24 7 Proving lack of full disclosure is equally
difficult: "Some directors insist they knew every penny Grasso got.
Others say they were confused. And still others now believe they were
misled." 248 If Spitzer fails to show interest or lack of full disclosure,
Grasso would be able to keep the entire compensation package.
Even if Grasso's compensation awards are not voided, under
the Board of Regents analysis, 249 Grasso and Langone would not be
absolved of liability for violating their duty of loyalty. In the Board of
Regents proceeding, this distinction was important because the
fairness of the transactions was irrelevant to the issue of whether the
trustees should be removed. 250 In this case, there would be few
practical implications, as Grasso and Langone are no longer directors
and Spitzer's main concern is voiding the compensation transaction.

244. See infra Part III.D.2.
245. See generally Complaint, supra note 3.
246. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 7 (alleging that Grasso regulated those who served on
the Compensation Committee, which allowed him to influence the directors); see also Elkind,
supra note 11, at 298 ('Many directors came from the securities industry, which, of course,
Grasso regulated ....
Grasso's status as a regulator made it difficult for Wall Street board
members to confront him and gave them strong incentives to make him happy.").
247. In his own words, Langone illustrates the difficulty in showing Grasso's improper
influence:
Having been there, I know the records will prove it was all above-board, well-vetted and fair. It
is absurd to suggest that the brightest minds and keenest thinkers on Wall Street were
befuddled by the complexity of Richard Grasso's compensation package - especially one
composed just like their own. Might as well say NASA couldn't launch a Goodyear blimp.
Langone, supra note 210, at A12.
See generally Elkind, supra note 11 (discussing rumors and stories of Grasso's influence over
directors, employees, and members).
248. Id. at X.

249. See text accompanying note 233.
250. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § III.A. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb.
10, 1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
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Finally, similar to the duty of care analysis, Spitzer can rely on
§ 202(a)(12) in arguing that Grasso and Langone breached their duties
of loyalty. 251 Under this analysis, Grasso's mere acceptance of the
compensation arguably is a violation of his duty of loyalty. 252 While
Spitzer does not cite § 202(a)(12) in his claim against Langone, there
seems no reason why a similar argument could not be made against
Langone.
To summarize, Spitzer may be successful in proving that
Grasso and Langone breached their duties of loyalty, but it will
probably be much more difficult to argue that the transactions should
be voided because a majority of the board approved his compensation.
Additionally, the lack of concrete evidence will make it difficult to
prove an improper influence over these directors.
IV. PROPOSALS
Commercial nonprofit organizations like the NYSE have much
in common with typical business corporations. For that reason, the
business corporation law serves as a good framework for large
N-PCL § 202(a)(12), which
commercial nonprofits. In addition,
requires nonprofit corporations to set reasonable compensation for
officers and directors, provides a strong weapon in any action
involving excessive compensation at a nonprofit corporation, provided
Coffee's second interpretation is accepted. The filing of Spitzer's
complaint alleging breaches of the duties of care and loyalty, as well
as corporate waste, further suggests that the law provides a sufficient
outlet to bring suits alleging excessive director compensation at
nonprofit corporations.
Yet it is not certain that Spitzer will prevail, nor is it certain
that the N-PCL will provide adequate relief in all cases of excessive
compensation at nonprofit organizations. Because the NYSE serves an
important public regulatory function, members lack financial
incentive to sue, and disclosure requirements of nonprofit corporations
are less rigorous than those applicable to for-profit corporations, this
Note proposes modifications to certain aspects of the N-PCL when
applied to the Exchange and other nonprofit corporations that serve
an important public role. This Note proposes: (1) liberalizing the
current standing and demand requirements to permit members and
other beneficiaries to initiate derivative suits more easily; (2)
maintaining the duty of care and business judgment rule; (3)
251. See text accompanying notes 137-145.
252. Id.
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broadening the duty of loyalty and waste claims that can be brought;
and (4) subjecting the Exchange to stricter disclosure requirements.
A.

Standing and Demand

Member suits and attorney general actions provide effective
vehicles for bringing suit against nonprofit corporations in cases of
excessive compensation. Due to the limited resources in the attorney
general's office, however, the attorney general cannot pursue every
possible action against every nonprofit organization. 253 The publicity
surrounding Grasso's compensation probably increased the chances of
the attorney general's involvement in this case, but this may not hold
true in all cases of executive compensation. While member standing
provides a good alternative to the attorney general, members may
choose not to sue, either because they fear retaliation, as was the case
with the Exchange, or, more likely, because they lack a financial
incentive. 254 Furthermore, many public nonprofit organizations do not
have members and therefore are left to rely solely on the attorney
general to take action.
This Note proposes that any party with a "sufficient special
interest" have standing to file a derivative suit against a nonprofit
corporation for excessive executive compensation. 255 While New York
law specifically prohibits standing by anyone other than those listed
by statute, some courts have given standing to parties with a
"sufficient special interest" in a charitable institution. 256 These
actions would be similar to derivative suits in that the corporation,
"[e]xcept in the most unusual circumstances,... should be the
recipient of any monetary recovery." 257 In the instant case, companies
listed on the Exchange would have a "sufficient special interest,"
thereby adding a third category of potential plaintiffs. In cases
involving charities, this type of standing could give large donors an
opportunity to sue; or in cases like Adelphi, students, alumni, faculty,

253. Lee, supra note 19, at 933.
254. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
255. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes,Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 652 (1998) (proposing that the
law "cautiously be opened for donor, member, and beneficiary derivative actions").
256. See, e.g., Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 934 (Cal.
1964) ("The prevailing view of other jurisdictions is that the Attorney General does not have
exclusive power to enforce a charitable trust and that a trustee or other person having a
sufficient special interest may also bring an action for this purpose."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
257. Goldschmid, supra note 255, at 652.
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and donors could directly sue the university for monetary damages to
be paid back to the university.
In each of these cases, the plaintiffs, whether a listed company
suing the Exchange, a donor suing a charity, or a student suing a
university, have both a financial stake and vested interest in seeing
that its respective nonprofit corporation is properly run. In the case of
the listed companies, the Exchange trades the member-plaintiffs'
stocks, meaning that their profitability depends on the Exchange's
proper functioning. Furthermore, listed companies would want to
assure that the NYSE remains a viable institution so that there is a
large marketplace for its securities. Likewise, a donor does not want
to see his or her donations go to a CEO's private use, and a student
wants his or her tuition money to provide educational services and to
improve the reputation of the school. In each of these circumstances,
the proposed plaintiffs would have a "sufficient special interest" to
confer standing.
Although "[1]ess stringent standing rules would undoubtedly
open the nonprofit sector to the danger of weak (but lawyer driven) or
spiteful litigation," this danger could be curbed in three ways. 258 First,
statute or judicial mandate could narrow the interpretation of
''sufficient special interest," thereby limiting parties who would have
standing.
Second, requiring parties with this "sufficient special
interest" to meet the 5 percent rule would diminish the risk of
frivolous suits.
Third, "statutory provisions or court decisions
providing that legal costs and fees will be awarded against plaintiffs
and their lawyers if an action is unreasonably brought or litigated
' 259
could moderate some of the danger.
Under current practice, the attorney general is often the only
party capable of bringing a suit against a nonprofit organization.
Adding a third category of possible plaintiffs may increase the number
of suits against nonprofit corporations and result in better policing of
breaches of a fiduciary duties.
This Note further recommends eliminating the demand
requirement for members and waiving demand in the proposed
"sufficient special interest" cases. As noted above, if a member is
required to show demand futility, the member will be faced with a
fairly high burden. 260 While proving demand futility would not be
necessary in Grasso's case, 261 it may be necessary in other executive
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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compensation cases that do not create as much publicity and the
resultant change in board of directors.
In addition, due to the
Exchange's important public function and its status as both an SRO
and a nonprofit corporation, the members, unlike shareholders, should
not be faced with a hurdle to a suit, especially in a case involving
breaches of fiduciary duties. For the same reason, other parties with a
"sufficient special interest" should not be faced with the same hurdle
that shareholders face.
B. FiduciaryDuties
1. Duty of Care
Courts may use three possible standards to measure a
nonprofit board of directors' duty of care: (1) the corporate standard,
(2) the trustee standard, or (3) an ordinary negligence standard. The
corporate standard, as discussed above, is a grossly negligent or
reckless standard. 262 The trustee standard, traditionally used for
charitable corporations, "is generally regarded as even more stringent
than the ordinary negligence standard... [because it] is measured
against the level of care exercised by a trustee managing his own
property... [and] entails an affirmative duty of caution." 263 Although
this standard would make it easier to hold directors liable for a breach
of their duty of care, its stringency could deter directors from serving
on the boards of nonprofit corporations for fear that they would
264
routinely be sued for any decision that they make.
One commentator has recommended a true ordinary negligence
standard for nonprofit directors based on the belief that the business
judgment rule should not apply to nonprofit corporations due to the
numerous differences between nonprofit corporations and for-profit
corporations. 265 "The primary argument articulated in defense of the
business judgment rule is the need to encourage risk-taking ...
Without the rule, many fear that directors and officers would become
excessively cautious." 266 But, unlike
for-profit corporations,
"[n]onprofit organizations should be more cautious in preserving their
resources because their obligation to donors and patrons is not to
262. See supra notes 146-157 and accompanying text.
263. Lee, supra note 19, at 936.
264. See Lee, supra note 19, at 949-50 (explaining that "some fear that qualified directors
would be reluctant to serve without the protection of the [business judgment] rule").
265. Id. at 945-68.
266. Id. at 945-46.
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maximize profits, but rather ... to provide services to its members or
the general public. '267 Thus, an ordinary negligence standard is not
needed with nonprofit corporations because they do not need to take
risks in order to make a profit.
This Note recommends maintaining the current corporate
standard duty of care as modified by the N-PCL's more expansive
statutory duty of care and § 202(a)(12). 268 Three reasons support this
proposal.
First, while nonprofits must be cautious with their resources,
risk-taking is still critical in the nonprofit context. As one
commentator explained, "[t]here is wisdom in protecting nonprofit
directors from hindsight review of their unsuccessful decisions and
encouraging them to change the configuration of their nonprofit
enterprises (e.g., expand' a nonprofit museum, produce a new
education or health care product.. .)."
Public-serving nonprofit
organizations, especially large commercial ones like the NYSE, need
to be able to take risks in order to better serve the public. In order to
maintain a stable market force, the NYSE necessarily will need to
take risks.269 The members of the NYSE, as well as the public
shareholders of the listed companies, presumably want the Exchange
to be able to act without the fear that a court will review every
decision under a pure ordinary negligence standard.
Second, the Adelphi case suggests that where the board has
acted particularly egregiously, courts will find that such board
decisions violated the business judgment rule and the board's duty of
care. 270 The business judgment rule thus does not act as a per se
prohibition on review of board decision-making.
In addition, an
expansive reading of N-PCL § 717(a) adds a further protection by
271
suggesting a slightly higher duty of care for nonprofit directions.
Finally, if courts interpret § 202(a)(12) as the Board of Regents
in the Adelphi case and Spitzer have, it will serve as an effective curb
on awards of excessive compensation. This interpretation will ensure
that any award or acceptance of unreasonable compensation to a
nonprofit executive or director will result in a breach of the duty of
272
care.
267. Lee, supra note 19, at 946.
268. See supra notes 152-155 (discussing the more expansive statutory duty of care), Part
iiI.C (discussing § 202(a)(12)).
269. Der Hovanesian & Elgin, supra note 71, at 78-79.
270. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
271. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999).
272. See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
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The Exchange does serve an important public regulatory
function, 273 as do many other nonprofits that serve the public. These
nonprofits should be cautious in preserving their resources; however,
the protection provided through the other proposals in this Note
274
should adequately address this concern.
2. Waste
Courts have used three different standards to define waste.
The first, known as the "classic standard," is nearly identical to the
New York waste standard used in Marx v. Akers. 275 It examines
whether "the consideration the corporation receives 'is so inadequate
in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would
deem it worth what the corporation has paid."' 276 As noted above,
satisfying this classic standard of waste can be difficult.2 77 A second,
higher standard is the reasonableness standard used in cases
involving closely-held corporations, also discussed above. 278
A third approach is even stricter than the reasonableness
standard and Delaware courts have used it to assess the fairness of
stock options. 279
This standard, known as the "proportionality
standard," has two prongs. The benefit prong requires that all
compensation "contain conditions, or that surrounding circumstances
are such that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the
contemplated benefit from the grant of options." The value prong
requires "a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefits
passing to the corporation and the value of the options granted."28 0
While the classic standard only examines "the value of the benefit and
whether a person of reasonable business judgment would call the
benefit a waste," the proportionality standard analyzes whether the
corporation is actually receiving a benefit from the compensation. 28 1
This Note proposes application of the reasonableness standard.
This standard is consistent with N-PCL § 202(a)(12), which requires
reasonable compensation to be paid and would further enforce the use
of a reasonableness test for compensation awards.
The stricter
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See supra Part II.A.2.
Lee, supra note 19, at 946.
Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1043 (N.Y. 1996).
Johnson, supra note 196, at 155.
Thomas & Martin, supra,note 36, at 582-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 204-210.
Johnson, supranote 196, at 157.
Id. at 157-60.
Id. at 161-62.
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proportionality standard is unnecessary because reasonableness, as
demonstrated above in the Grasso case, 28 2 seems likely to curb
excessive awards of compensation. Moreover, courts accustomed to
applying a reasonableness analysis may have difficulty with the
subjective elements of the proportionality standard.
The less stringent classic standard provides inadequate
protection to the NYSE members and investors. As discussed above,
Grasso may be more likely to prevail under this standard. 28 3 This
28 4
example reinforces the theory that waste is very difficult to prove.
Protection against corporate waste is especially important with
respect to nonprofit corporations because resources typically are
limited and should be completely devoted to serving the public. While
the NYSE's resources are not limited to the extent that it can continue
to require fees from its members, its resources, like that of all public
nonprofit corporations, should not be wasted, but rather spent in ways
that better serve the public or its members.
3. Duty of Loyalty
Four approaches have been advanced to hold nonprofit
directors and officers liable for duty of loyalty violations. First, the
corporate standard, exemplified by § 715 of New York's N-PCL and §
713 of the Business Corporation Law, provides three methods for
protecting transactions voidable due to a conflict of interest. 28 5 This
standard permits self-dealing transactions to be ratified easily by a
majority vote of disinterested directors or members and does not
adequately protect against conflicts of interest. 28 6 In discussing its
application in the for-profit setting, one commentator found that the
corporate standard does not provide effective deterrence of director
First, the approval is rarely
misconduct for two reasons.
As discussed above, Grasso allegedly influenced
disinterested. 28 7
other directors whose companies were listed on the Exchange. Yet,
proving this influence may be difficult due to the abstractness of

282. See supra notes 209-226 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
284. Thomas & Martin, supra,note 36, at 582-83.
285. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 2003).
286. Id.
287. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking With Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 654 (2003) ("[D]isinterested
shareholders will be influenced by the board of directors" through its proxy statements and by its
ability to use "the corporate treasury ... to spend conspicuous sums to obtain approval of the
interested transaction.").
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influence or pressure. 28 8 Second, "[d]isinterested approval presupposes
full disclosure of all material information. ' 28 9 Because directors may
not always make full disclosure and because courts differ on their
interpretation of materiality, "[i]nadequate information raises the risk
that shareholders will approve an unfair transaction." 290 Similarly,
members or directors may not possess all material information
relevant to a possible conflict of interest and could, like shareholders,
be easily swayed by statements and "campaigning" from the CEO.
This occurred at the NYSE, where directors were not given full
information about Grasso's pay package, 291 and at Adelphi, where the
trustees were not fully informed of other trustees' conflicts of
29 2
interest.
A second approach to duty of loyalty violations is an absolute
prohibition on any self-dealing transactions; however, this type of
prohibition could deter instances of self-dealing that may be useful to
the board. 293 For instance, if a member of the board of directors could
get the Exchange a cheaper rate on an electronic system that would
speed the processing of sales on the Exchange floor because his
company owned the machine, members and companies would most
likely want to ratify this transaction. With a blanket prohibition
against self-dealing, though, ratification would be impossible. A third
proposal would "require advance administrative approval of all selfdealing transactions" by an appropriate state agency. 294 New York
probably would not "have the budget resources to develop the requisite
administrative expertise," 295 making this option unworkable.
The final approach, and the one which this Note endorses,
would consider any "self-dealing transaction ... voidable unless the
transaction's proponents can affirmatively establish its fairness to the
corporation at the time of the transaction." 296 Courts currently use
this standard for transactions entered into by controlling
shareholders. 297 Because it would result in judicial review of the

288. See supra notes 246-247 and accompanying text.
289. Brown, supra note 287, at 659 (emphasis added).
290. Id. (finding that "Delaware courts consistently refuse to require disclosure of material
information in at least two critical circumstances").
291. See, e.g. Complaint, supranote 3, at 21; see also note 248 and accompanying text.
292. Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § 1II.A. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. Feb.
10, 1997), available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/adelphi.html.
293. Hansmann, supranote 18, at 569-72.
294. DeMott, supranote 68, at 144.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 143; Goldschmid, supra note 255, at 648 (arguing for a fairness test).
297. DeMott, supra note 68, at 144.
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merits of any self-dealing transaction, this standard should effectively
deter potential abuses by directors and officers. 298 In addition to
deterring abuses, a higher standard for nonprofit corporations is the
fairest approach considering that "[t]hese corporations ... receive
enormous tax benefits."299 "[I]f commercial nonprofits are dissatisfied
with this arrangement, they can easily convert to for-profit status if
' 300
they feel the benefits . . . outweigh the tax and public subsidies.
"Business and financial relationships, familial relationships, and
'taints' to the process, for example, which might be considered of
marginal concern in the for-profit context, should be resolved in favor
of review under loyalty standards . .. when nonprofit institutions are
involved." 30 1 This principle is especially true for public nonprofits like
the Exchange, which serve an important regulatory or public-type
function. It undermines the power and prestige of the Exchange as a
market-regulator when it fails to regulate its own directors.
C. Disclosure
"In the for-profit sector, easier-to-read disclosures about details
of executive compensation arrangements are an integral part of the
SEC regulation of reports to shareholders." 30 2 It is logical that
"disclosure of financial ... information about nonprofit entities would
30 3
make them easier to monitor and would enhance accountability.
New York Law requires nonprofit corporations to disclose certain
financial information annually. 30 4 In November 2004, the SEC
"unanimously proposed rules . . . that would require . . . the nation's
stock exchanges . . . to disclose how much they pay their five top
executives." 30 5 The SEC's director of market regulation also stated, "It
is my belief that SROs should comply with substantially all of the
transparency and disclosure requirements of public, listed

298. Id.
299. Lee, supra note 19, at 948 (arguing for an ordinary negligence standard for duty of
care).
300. Id. at 948-49.
301. Goldschmid, supranote 255, at 651.
302. Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt
Organizations:Reasonableness, Comparability,and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819, 857 (1997).
303. Id. at 857-58.
304. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2003).
305. Carrie Johnson & Ben White, SEC Backs Stock Market Rules: Proposal Would Require
Independent Board Majorities, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at E03. These rules have not been
officially adopted yet.
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companies. ' 30 6 Because the exchanges serve such an important
regulatory function and indirectly serve the investing public, they
should also be subject to the same reporting requirements as the
companies that trade on their floors. This Note recommends that the
extensive disclosure requirements regarding executive compensation,
currently imposed on the listed companies, be extended to other large
nonprofit corporations that serve the public.
Their financial
information should be as public as that of large for-profit corporations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The New York Stock Exchange is an important and unique
institution. Each day it serves a wide variety of investors by providing
a place to trade securities and, hopefully, make money. Because the
Exchange is structured as a Type A nonprofit corporation, New York
nonprofit corporation law governs its operation. The N-PCL, which is
largely based on for-profit corporation law, provides a solid framework
for reviewing charges of excessive executive compensation by
nonprofit corporations. The Grasso case demonstrates, however, that
the N-PCL may not provide sufficient relief.
For these reasons, this Note proposes five changes to the NPCL when applied to the Exchange and similar nonprofit corporations
that serve important public roles. First, standing should be expanded
to permit parties with a "sufficient special interest" to bring
derivative-type actions. Second, demand should be abolished. Third,
a reasonableness standard for waste should be used. Fourth, a duty of
loyalty standard that examines the fairness of any self-interested or
conflicted transaction is recommended.
Finally, the state should
impose greater
disclosure
requirements
so that executive
compensation is reported clearly in the same way that SEC guidelines
require public companies to report compensation.
Although the ultimate outcome of the Grasso case may result
in the curbing of excessive compensation at the Exchange and in
substantial internal reforms, not every case of compensation or
violation of fiduciary duties will receive this type of publicity and its
consequent internal reactions. For these important but less publicized
cases, stricter standards are necessary to assure the full protection of
the public who rely on the efficient functioning of nonprofit
corporations that serve them. The proposed changes should create a
fairer balance between potential plaintiffs and the corporations so that
306. Annette L. Nazareth, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks before the SIA Market Conference
(May 21, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch052104aln.htm).
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cases alleging serious fiduciary duty violations can be heard without
imposing excessive costs on the corporations in defending such
litigation.
Rachel Penski*
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Clinical trials pose a fundamental conflict between
physicians' commitment to protecting the medical best interests of
current patients and the goal of producing scientific knowledge for
the potential benefit of patients in the future. While this conflict has
long been of interest to physicians and bioethicists, it has largely
escaped the attention of legal scholars. That is likely to change,
however, as a growing wave of litigation brought by individuals
injured in clinical trials will force courts to determine the nature of
researchers' legal obligations to subjects.
In making these
determinations, this Article argues, courts must recognize that
medical research is fundamentally different from ordinary clinical
treatment, in terms of both its underlying purposes and its
methodology. In light of these differences, requiring researchers to
adhere to the same therapeutic obligations as treatingphysicians, as
some commentators have advocated, would be tantamount to a
virtual prohibition of clinical trials, an outcome that courts should
reject. At the same time, it would be a mistake to hold that
researchers have no duty whatsoever to protect the medical best
interests of individual subjects. This Article therefore develops an
alternative framework for conceptualizing researchers' duties to
subjects, using principles governing conflicts of interests in fiduciary
relationships a starting point for analysis.
These principles
demonstrate that it is possible to protect vulnerable individuals in
dependent relationships without absolutely precluding the pursuit of
goals that potentially conflict with those individuals' overall
welfare. Importantly, however, consent is generally insufficient to
justify deviations from the pursuit of the best interests of the
beneficiary in a fiduciary relationship; instead, the law imposes
additional requirements to ensure that such deviations are
objectively fair. After explaining why a similar approach makes
sense in the context of clinical trials, this Article provides a specific
framework for using those principles to resolve conflicts between the
pursuit of scientific knowledge and subjects' medical needs.

